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Introduction
In this paper I argue that Resource and Environmental economists  are doing a disproportionate
level of nonmarket valuation, "demand" or benefit estimation research, relative to what one
could loosely call "supply" or cost analysis. By nonmarket valuation I mean deriving willingness-
to-pay (WTP) values for unpriced goods and services. By cost analysis I mean economically
oriented trade-off analyses e.g. estimating potential opportunity costs of, for example, managing
forests to provide these goods and services. The first part of the paper reviews the basis of my
skepticism of nonmarket valuation. The second part of the paper identifies why I believe cost
analysis is a challenge, particularly in the context of ecological sustainability, and provides some
examples of such work.
The demand side
A considerable amount of intellectual effort is being expended by economists deriving monetary
measures of unpriced goods and services (G&S). The methods include: contingent valuation
where individuals are asked what they would be willing to pay for provision of  G&S (Mitchell
and Carson, 1989); the travel cost method where costs of travel are taken as a surrogate of
what people would be willing to pay for the experience of recreating in parks or wilderness
areas for example; hedonic pricing where variations in demand can be statistically related to
attributes (e.g. environmental conditions) of the good in question; choice experiments where
respondents are asked to choose between alternative end states and preferences teased out
through sophisticated statistical analyses. There is an enormous literature on the theory and
application of these methods  (see Freeman, 1994 for a review). Journals like Land Economics
(LE), Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (JEEM), American Journal of
5Agricultural Economics and even Ecological Economics regularly contain nonmarket valuation
articles.
A search of the Agricola and Econlit databases using "contingent valuation" resulted in 505 hits;
"Travel cost" resulted in 210 hits. Vatn and Bromley (1994) noted that since 1994 about 30%
of papers in LE and JEEM, two leading journals resource economists publish in, were
concerned with valuation. Identifying references to opportunity cost type analysis is somewhat
more problematic for several reasons however as an indication "opportunity cost" yielded 324
hits, "trade-offs", 416 hits, while economic trade-offs only 12. This was not intended to be an
exhaustive search. There would be repeat occurrences of some references in these searches.
"Trade-off" articles were mostly biological issues. However, this brief set of searches and
personal experience would seem to suggest there is a significant amount of effort being
expended on nonmarket valuation research. Applied "supply side" or cost analysis would
appear to be more specialized and generally more difficult to find in the literature.
Even non-economists are getting into the game of nonmarket valuation. Costanza et al 1997
recently published a paper in Nature on the subject:
We have estimated the current economic value of 17 ecosystem services for 16 biomes,
based on published  studies and a few original calculations. For the entire biosphere, the
value (most of which outside the market) is estimated to be in the range of US$16-54
trillion (1012) per year….."
The uninitiated might ask why come up with these numbers. Costanza et al. suggest the exercise
is essential in order to :
1) make the range of potential values of the services of ecosystems more apparent;
2) establish at least a first approximation of the relative magnitude of global ecosystem
services;
3) set up a framework for further analysis;
4) point out those areas most in need of additional research;
5) stimulate additional research and debate.
Common (1997, 1998) critiques this rationale on several fronts suggesting the numbers are
essentially meaningless for decision-making and the numbers tell us little about priorities for
sustainability. Are the numbers reported in the article big or small ?
6Economists might argue that this type of benefit estimation is necessary to remove some of the
subjectivity in resource management decisions involving trade-offs between market and
nonmarket values. A quantification of preferences provides a "price" or relative value to guide
decision makers. Having an "objectively" determined price would imply some semblance of
consumer sovereignty.  Ideally these numbers could be used in some form of environmentally
adjusted Cost/Benefit Analysis (EACBA)  and the decision maker can let the data inform them
of what trade-offs should be made to satisfy economic efficiency criteria.  This approach would
presumably eliminate decision-makers own "subjective" biases about what should be done and
provide the numbers required to maximize the asset value of all resources under their
stewardship. There is some merit in these arguments insofar as it is an attempt to find an
objective gauge of preferences for publicly owned resources in the context of pursuing
economic efficiency. Contrary to common perceptions, this type of work is a clear recognition
by economists that these values are important. Economist's motivations lie in understanding the
relative importance that people place on these environmental attributes.  The question really is
whether nonmarket valuation is a valid and reliable mechanism for preference revelation and
economic efficiency is an appropriate goal for problems with significant environmental
implications.
Common (1998) notes three arguments against the use EACBA. The first relates to ethics.
Economists and non-economists argue whether the numbers are actually valid to use for
resource management. Sagoff (1988; 1994) argues that where there are environmental
implications of decisions, people should be consulted as citizens not consumers. People's
preferences will be different whether they are consulted as citizens or consumers (see also
Blamey et al 1995).  Common (1998) notes that those who reject EACBA on ethical grounds
have little to say about what could replace it. This is an important point and one that irks
economists who argue that it is prices that provide an objective weighting of  relative
preferences.
The second set of arguments relates to the reliability of nonmarket valuations. Vatn and Bromley
(1994) argue that environmental goods and services have a fundamental complexity and multiple
attribute nature that make them particularly difficult to value; that is, be represented by a single
metric. They describe the pitfalls of environmental valuation as comprised of : a) cognition
problems including "perception and functional transparency" (the world is complicated); "valuing
across scales" - individuals have difficulties comparing values across market and nonmarket
goods and the measurement procedure itself influences the measurement; the elicitation
7procedures constructs preferences rather than uncovers them; b) incongruity problems -
basically if attributes of goods are incongruous (incommensurable), a single valuation (price) will
not capture the required information and people will not be able to make the required coherent
judgements; c) composition problems - which relates to the dynamic interrelatedness of many
environmental values (at least perceived so). Vatn and Bromley (1994) suggest valuation
(pricing) is neither necessary nor sufficient for coherent and consistent choices about the
environment. For market goods if a consumer makes a "wrong" choice on the basis of
incomplete information in price, only the consumer knows of the mistake and bears its
consequences. The same cannot be said for "wrong" choices in the context of environmental
goods and services.  In many cases the nature of the environmental good, lack of property rights
and even the capacity to establish property rights means that everyone would bear the costs of
“wrong” valuations.
One can speculate that it is the type of issues noted by Vatn and Bromley (1994) that reveal
themselves as confounding particular applications. Contingent valuation applicatoins are mired
with difficulties such as framing (context) effects (Mitchell and Carson 1989), embedding effects
(i.e. Valuations are dependent on whether a good is valued as part of a larger good; see
Kahneman and Knetsch 1992); information effects (i.e. the level of information provided can
effect results; see Macdonald and McKenney 1996); and symbolic effects (i.e. where the
subject being valued can act for larger issues; see Macdonald et al. 1997; Blamey and Common
1995). Table 1 summarizes some of the results from Macdonald and McKenney (1996) which
provide a simple indication of the range of variation possible in WTP values from a survey that
only varied the level of information provision. Information provision is problematic for many
issues which are uncertain and contentious (e.g. biodiversity conservation). The problem is that
information provision inevitably conditions preferences. This is a particularly difficult issue (see
also Sagoff, 1988). Even reasonable people could differ as to the appropriate level of
information to provide and what is a fair representation of the "truth" in highly uncertain and
contentious conditions.
Reliability problems particularly reveal themselves in decision making applications. Common and
McKenney (1994) used a Monte Carlo simulation experiment to show how easy it was to get
an incorrect decision when a travel cost model was used derive a recreation value to compare
to timber values in an old growth forest area. The correct cost benefit decision in the model was
not to harvest because the recreational value outweighed the timber value. As was shown, it is
very easy to get the "wrong" number even in what would be judged a very straightforward
application and decision problem. In this example the aggregate WTP for recreation for the old
8growth forest are very sensitive to the population size and non-linear relationships in the
estimated demand functions. Although the results are conditioned by the experimental design,
these are issues facing any application that would use the results of a nonmarket valuation. It
clearly shows how problematic applications can be when the nonmarket values are meant to be
used for actual decisions. Common (1998) goes through a numerical travel cost example in the
context of the Tidbinbilla Nature reserve outside Canberra, Australia which also shows how
easy it would be to do the "wrong" thing if one was to use travel cost methodology to decide on
development options.
The third issue that Common (1998) raises that my personal experience validates is that many
economists believe the derivation of nonmarket values would promote sustainability e.g.
assigning something a positive price that currently has a zero price would promote its
conservation. Common and Perrings (1992) show mathematically that correcting market failures
(e.g. attaching a price to a nonmarket good) is not a sufficient condition for sustainability.  Using
pseudo market prices simply promotes the notion of consumer sovereignty not sustainability per
se.
My perspective on nonmarket valuation should not be construed as arguing against public
involvement in resource management. These are criticisms about the usefulness of nonmarket
valuation as a preference elicitation tool and as reliable (or even true) economic measures that
can be used in EACBA. Given the inherent complexities, uncertainties and controversies in
environmental management, more thought provoking mechanisms are likely required to discern
stable, considered preferences. Citizen's juries (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997) seem to be one
avenue worth pursuing. In the end there are probably two schools of thought regarding
nonmarket valuation - those claiming the problems associated with it are so great that
abandoning it would not involve any great loss and those who believe the derivation and use of
the numbers are critical to economically rational decision-making.
In fact I know of very few studies that actually try to use the numbers in a CBA. The Common
and McKenney study cited above was a computer experiment. So are economists really just
talking to themselves when they derive these numbers? Except in the U.S. where the numbers
appear to be used in the judicial system for litigation purposes it is not clear to me that the
efforts are much more than academic exercises filling the pages of scholarly journals. There does
not seem to be the same type of  pressure on Australian, British or Canadian economists to
come up with these numbers for policy development or environmental decision making or even
litigation purposes but there still are many involved in such exercises. My personal judgement is
9that most nonmarket values are more likely to be used more as political batons by particular
stakeholders rather than hard numbers for hard decisions.
"Supply side" or cost analyses
Here I will try to create the setting for such analyses in the context of forest management. Forest
management exemplifies many of the essential challenges in the pursuit of sustainability. The
biological systems are capable of producing a wide range of, mostly nonmarket, good and
services. Valuing them is difficult as noted above. Even coming up with the right values for
marketed goods such as timber is difficult and often contentious. A third complicating factor in
forestry is its intertemporal nature. Forests can produce these goods and services through time.
Investments in regeneration do not manifest themselves as timber for many years but can
provide a flow of habitat for early successional species in the shorter term. Replacing old forests
with young forests clearly precludes a flow of suitable habitat for species that require older
forests. Hyde (1980) notes the usual classes of forest uses are timber, recreation, forage, fish
and other wildlife, water and wilderness. To that we can add harbors of biodiversity and
maintenance of ecosystem functions. Hyde (1980) suggests dispersed recreation, including
some hunting, fishing and hiking, wilderness and biological reserves all compete with timber
production:
These uses cannot exist jointly with timber production on the same
forestland base. They probably have very low direct production costs….. the
opportunity value of timber on profitable forestland approximates the value that
must be exceeded if additional land is to be devoted to competing uses
Our empirical estimation of the timber opportunity value are based on
an assumption of economic efficiency. Where efficiency is not the rule in timber
management , as it often is not today,  then the observed opportunity values for
timber are lower than the potential values; fewer acres can be justified for
timber management and competing uses are even easier to justify so long as
inefficiencies in timber management exist.
In anticipation of an objection, we note that there is no conceptual
reason that land allocation decisions could not be based on the value of
competing, nontimber opportunities, and the land allocated to timber production
only when the value of the latter is demonstrably greater than competing
values. In application, however, data on these values are less available;
therefore they are more difficult to calculate than timber values. In fact, a merit
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of using the timber opportunity cost is that knowledge of absolute competitive
values is never necessary for decision making. We must only assess their
magnitude as greater or less than known timber values  (p. 9)
Hyde makes another related point: Multiple use implies a different socially efficient
allocation of forestland on those acres where timber production and a joint use
together create positive net benefits, but timber alone has a negative net value (p. 8-9).
 These quotes actually set the stage quite well for applied work but several points are worth
noting:
1) Hyde notes the challenge of nonmarket valuation - I am less optimistic than he;
2) In most parts of the world even timber values are not trivial to derive (usually priced by
bureaucrats rather than through competitive markets); pursuit of economic efficiency in
timber production is often a tough sell for economists.
3) The multiple use aspect is tricky because it involves joint products and joint costs. Assigning
costs to a particular output (e.g. timber) in such situations is inevitably an arbitrary decision
(Bowes and Krutilla, 1989).
4) Despite (2) Sustainability constraints (e.g. a particular biological reserve system) can be
compared to timber opportunity costs - the role of the economist here is to help assess the
effectiveness of alternative paths
What sustainability constraints, objectives or targets mean in practice is still being debated in
academia, bureaucracies and interested publics. It is not clear that we will know if or when we
achieve it.  Ecologists do not seem to have simple rules of thumb to guide resource managers.
They do have many relevant concepts that manifest themselves in journals like Conservation
Biology, Conservation Ecology, Biological Conservation and many others. Lunney et al. (1997)
talk about four criteria for judging the adequacy of  ecological reserve systems: number and area
of reserves, representativeness, vulnerability and viability.  In an oft-cited paper, Margules and
Usher (1981) talk about a number of conservation "criteria" that should be used to assess
progress in nature conservation (ecological sustainability ?): endemism, diversity, abundance,
area, naturalness, habitat suitability, representativeness, remoteness and rarity. The fact is there
is no simple unequivocal criteria for assessing sustainability (see also Common et al, 1993).
Ecological values manifest themselves at different scales.  There are trade-offs between all of
these constructs. They are not easily represented in resource management models/tools for
reasons of data availability and their inherent complex nature.
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Are there example applications in the literature ? Below I highlight a few for illustrative
purposes.
In the context of managing the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker in the southern U.S.,
Hyde (1989) examined the costs of  two management alternatives: 1) a permanent ban on
timber harvesting in sites currently occupied by the bird and 2) extending the rotation period to
an age that would enable the trees to develop nesting cavities.  The second approach allowed
timber harvesting in all stands but proved to be more costly. Although land was excluded from
timber production in (1), the value of that loss was less than the cost of extending the rotation
length to many stands over a large area.
McKenney and Lindenmeyer (1994) compared the cost of  a nest box strategy to conserve
Leadbeater's possum in central Victoria, Australia to logging bans in the old growth forests they
occupy. The cost of nestboxes were calculated over 3 to 10 year replacement periods (5 to 10
boxes per hectare) at unit costs of $Aus 50 to $Aus 200 per box (inclusive of installation). Only
the longer replacement periods and the lower costs per box were less costly than logging bans
(which were calculated to be equivalent to $79 to $96 per hectare per year for the old growth).
Interestingly, with nestbox costs of  $200/box and 3-5 year replacement periods even bans on
younger more productive forests would be economically justified.
McKenney et al. (in review) examined a larger scale habitat management problem in
northwestern Ontario. The species was woodland caribou, a nomadic and uncommon species
that seems to have been driven north by a complex interaction of  timber harvesting methods
that purposely promote moose and indirectly deer and wolves.  A proposed management
guideline would have timber harvesting operations occur over much larger areas (100 km2
versus 100-250 ha) with constraints on harvesting adjacent areas within 20 to 40 years. The
planning area becomes over 7,000,000 ha and 17 forest management units. Using GIS data on
forest inventories summarized in 100 km2 blocks, expected growth rates and standing timber
values that varied according to distance from the mill, we used a simulated annealing model to
calculate the opportunity cost of  harvesting timber across the region with spatial adjacency
constraints. Depending on what you believe about standing timber values, the cost of this type of
habitat management ranged from $Can 129,000,000 to $Can 295,000,000 .  This translated
into $0.74 to $1.17 per Ontario resident
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Common (1998) did some back of the envelope calculations to calculate what Australians
would have to be willing to pay to stop development at Kakadu. A Cost-Benefit analysis of the
net mining value of the area was estimated at $Aus 82,000,000 (@8% discount rate). Common
(1998) worked out that this roughly equates to $1.03 per adult Australian over a 10 year
period.  He notes that it is hard to believe that any CVM, or similar exercise, could produce a
number lower than $1 per annum per adult  for any environmental value. The Kakadu CV study
(Imber et al. 1990) estimated WTP values from $52 to $143 per annum for 10 years.
Common's "inverse analysis" (Krutilla and Fisher, 1975) could have saved the Australian
Resource Assessment Commission the cost of the CV study (approx. $400,000).
Montgomery et al. (1994) provide a very interesting analysis of the Spotted Owl controversy in
the Pacific Northwest of the United States. This Owl invoked a huge debate in the United
States about the costs and benefits of habitat protection for endangered species. The stakes
were (are) high. These are high timber value forests with, to many, equally high spiritual and
environmental values. Job losses were projected at 18,000, primarily in small communities with
timber-based economies. Their analysis attempted to quantify the additional costs of increasing
the probability of the Owl's survival in terms of losses in producer and consumer surplus. They
used a population simulation model that quantified the probability of survival in terms of habitat
capacity that could be linked to decreases in timber supply.  These decreases in timber supply
were translated into economic costs through a spatial timber market model. An 82% probability
of survival for the Owl was estimated to cost $US 21 billion, 91%, $ US 33 billion and 95%,
$US 46 billion. Their point being that species survival is not a sure thing and alternative
protection states involve different (increasing marginal) costs.
There are several details of this study that I could quarrel with (e.g. they appear to have used
consumer and producer surplus estimates from some final product markets, these values did not
incorporate any uncertainties). Nevertheless the study does represent a thorough
interdisciplinary analyses of  an ecological management problem. Biologists had difficulties with
the study because of the cardinal rankings, preferring to articulate the alternative management
strategies in terms of "high, medium or low" survivals. Perhaps this represents a different
disciplinary perspectives ? Economists are interested in affects at the margin i.e. the implication
of small changes on the overall result, while ecologists don't see it possible to tease out that level
of detail from their understanding of the systems. Translating the Montgomery et al (1994)
results into a per person metric gives a lump sum cost of these three protection plans as ranging
from $84 to $184 per US resident (assume 250,000,000 US residents). One contingent
valuation study of the willingness to pay to preserve the Spotted Owl gave an average WTP of
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$49.72, which, after some “adjustments” resulted in an estimated aggregate annual WTP  of
$1.418 billion (Rubin et al., 1991). Rubin et al.’s 1991 CBA on Spotted Owl preservation
resulted in positive net benefits.
The studies noted above quantified economic costs to environmental asset protection in lump
sum and in per person terms. Clearly recasting opportunity costs into per person values changes
the scale of the results. Are these large costs to ecological constraints ? As taxpayers and
consumers we pay $100s if not 1000s annually towards education and health care. Microsoft
corporation made $US 3.9 billion profit last year off sales of $US13.1 billion while General
Motors corporation made $5.7 billion off $US 164.8 billion. These are large numbers.
Two issues non-economists continually raise as contentious in studies such as these are: a) the
actual values used for timber production and what b) distributional effects. From an economic
perspective, standing timber values are the correct starting point for quantifying opportunity
costs of managing forestlands for competing values. Convincing foresters and other non-
economists of this is often not easy. Quantifying distributional implications means clarifying who
bears the costs and who receives the benefits. Economics has little to say on choices that have
distributional implications other than the beneficiaries should be able to, in principle, compensate
the losers (Bowes and Krutilla, 1989).
Concluding Comments
It is always dangerous to comment on the value of  other people's research (although there is a
huge economic literature evaluating other people's research). In this paper I have provided an
overview of the basis for my skepticism on nonmarket valuation. I believe if more economists
were involved in characterizing ecological concepts such as habitat suitability, diversity,
representativeness, etc. in trade-off models economists may be taken more seriously in natural
resource management.  Economists should investigate the cost effectiveness of alternative paths
to achieving ecological goals. Such an approach would have an educational effect and promote
more interdisciplinary applied research.  Economists are good at thinking about the big picture,
being critical about choices and sometimes costs, not at quantifying nonmarket benefits or
making final decisions.
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Table 1: Mean WTP values ($Can) from a high and low information provision CV study
(Macdonald and McKenney (1996). Respondents were asked 1, 2 or 3 questions about how
much they would be willing to pay for either an increase in Canadian parks, Ontario parks or a
local provincial park near Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Canada.
Resource valued Low info.
n = 177
High info
N = 151
Low info
N = 199
High info
N = 144
Low info
N = 149
High info
N = 166
5% incr. in
Canadian.
Wilderness
163 54
2-3% incr. in
Ont. Wilderness
90 32 109 39
10% incr in local
prov. Park
57 23 45 22 74 28
